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Previous “systems” of rhetoric, which have arisen as responses to felt
needs, emphasize an individualist paradigm whereas the contemporary system, responding to current impulses, tends toward a relational
paradigm. The “Trinity” is proposed here as a trope that both prefigures this relational and dialogical turn in communication studies and
suggests the ethical ends toward which communication praxis should
aim. In particular, the Trinitarian thought of Chiara Lubich offers a
unique perspective on the relational current in communication studies,
especially its links of ontology with praxis, relational being with communication, and kenosis with perichoresis.
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D

ouglas Ehninger’s groundbreaking synthesis of historic
patterns in communication studies, which appeared in
Philosophy and Rhetoric in 1968, recognizes common characteristics of rhetorical inquiries arising out of felt needs within
three respective eras. Ehninger calls rhetorical investigations that
participate in a common response to needs of these given periods
“systems of rhetoric.” Implicit in each of these “systems” is a philosophy of being: for the period that Ehninger names “Classical,”
persons are rational beings; for the “Enlightenment Period,” persons are cognitive beings; and for the Modern Period, persons are
social beings. Three loci of inquiry correspond with Ehninger’s three
systems and attendant philosophies. For Classic rhetorical theory,
the syllogism could locate much of rhetorical investigation. For the
Enlightenment Period, the mind or thought could be viewed as the
central site of exploration. And for the Modern Period, the society takes central spot. Almost prophetically, in characterizing the
Modern Period as “sociological” in its concern with human relations and social cohesion,1 Ehninger anticipates a fourth period
that is the subject of this essay.
We are now removed more than 40 years from the period at
which Ehninger’s review stops. An updating or extension of the
Modern Period profile into what can be called the Contemporary
Period thus seems warranted. Modern theories that Ehninger described in his article continue to exert influence today, yet substantial
new theories have taken their place alongside the feted rhetorical
ideas advanced during the middle to late part of the twentieth
century. This essay will focus on one significant development in
1. Douglas Ehninger, “On Systems of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric (1968): 131–
144.
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contemporary theory anticipated in Enhinger’s analysis: the dialogical current.
This extension of Ehninger’s analysis will revisit his depiction
of the “felt need” of our times and will identify key strands of communication studies2 that arise out of that exigency and work to
remedy it. In so doing, I seek to deepen our understanding of an
evolution in emphasis begun within the past half-century, from
the three previous systems’ emphasis on individualist paradigms of
discrete speakers, texts, and thought processes to a communitarian
paradigm that stresses both the re-definition of beings as social,
relational creatures and the interconnectedness of communicators and their jointly constructed messages. In the realm of new
media, for example, Chen and Ding find that a linear, monologic
and technique-oriented model has given way to a relationshiporiented and dialogic model.3 Examination of such a shift sheds
light on the collective nature of communication inquiry as we come
to understand how theorists respond together, even if unwittingly,
to common impulses and as we consider the good to which new
grasps of communication might be put.
My aim in this analysis is to identify the ontological view that
contemporary theories advance. To do so, I begin with a profile of
“the felt need” out of which contemporary theory arises and present that theory, dialogical in nature, as a response to “the felt need.”
Next, I present “the Trinity” as a theoretical trope that prefigures
this theory and functions as an emblem of the collective qualities
in contemporary theory. Finally, I contemplate a relational communication ethic that might derive from the Trinity trope as a
2. Hereafter, I shall abbreviate “communication and rhetorical studies” as “communication studies.”
3. X. Chen and G. Ding, “New Media as Relations,” Chinese Journal of Communication
2 (2009): 367–379.

C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 2013)

fitting response to contemporary impulses. In short, this essay situates and sketches a major current in communication studies and
points to the ends toward which contemporary communication
studies might work.
The “Felt Need” of Our Times and the Quest for a Solution
Rapid sociopolitical change has produced “anomie in the past several decades.” 4 The effects of anomie, as Durkheim noted, have
been a lack of regulation (social norms) and a lack of integration
(concern for welfare of others).5 A profound sense of separation
from God, from one another, and from oneself permeates the
land. With this separateness have come disillusionment and the
experience of loss.6 The incidence of two world wars in the twentieth century and persistent regional and international conflicts and
wars in the twentieth-first century, to say nothing of terrorism,
attest that the fabric of the human family is torn. As early as 1985,
Bellah and his collaborators had declared that we live in a time and
“culture of separation.” 7 Today deep fractures within and among
nations, religions, ethnic and other identity groups, political parties, families, and individual selves can be seen. The rise of pluralism
often intensifies the rift as groups pit themselves against perceived
detractors in asserting their rights and privileges and elbow one
another for a more prominent place at the table. As Papa and her
4. Ruohui Zhao and Liqun Cao, “Social Change and Anomie: A Cross-National
Study,” Social Forces 88 (2010): 1210.
5. Hayden P. Smith and Robert M. Bohm, “Beyond Anomie: Alienation and Crime,”
Critical Criminology: An International Journal 16 (2008): 2.
6. Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999), p. 150.
7. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen,William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life ( New York:
Harper and Row, 1985), p. 277.
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collaborators lament: “Fragmentation occurs when there are multiple voices and interpretations present in a cultural setting. This
multivocality separates people from one another rather than unifying them into a consensus.”8 Communication theory itself often
eschews unifying critical schemes, warding them off as authoritarian devices that oppress and silence powerless peoples, advocating,
instead, an “uncivil tongue.” 9
Communication praxis mirrors this pervasive disconnectedness. This is evident in the fragmentary, polemic, and often inflammatory forms that messages take, particularly during election
cycles, as they fly toward us on cable television, talk radio, and web
logs. Even the vaunted “connectivity” of our times leaves “users” at
once wired but remote as electronic devices tend to be consumed
privately and remain to the individual user as solitary “my-spaces,”
leaving us, in the words by which Sherry Turkle has entitled her
recent book, “Alone Together.” 10
In the face of the decided thrust toward separation and division, however, a countercurrent within communication studies,
intensified in the closing decades of the twentieth century, works
to restore human community and mutual understanding. “Our
time is marked by a yearning for wholeness,” writes Rushing.11
A discourse of “connection” has emerged, particularly in feminist
8. Wendy Papa, Michael Papa, Krishna Kandath, Tracy Worrell, and Nithya Muthuswamy, “Dialectic of Unity and Fragmentation in Feeding the Homeless: Promoting
Social Justice through Communication,” Atlantic Journal of Communication 13 (2005):
250.
9. Nina Lozano-Reich, and Dana Cloud, “The Uncivil Tongue: Invitational Rhetoric
and the Problem of Inequality,” Western Journal of Communication 73 (2009): 220–236.
10. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from
Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011).
11. Janice Hocker Rushing, “E. T. as Rhetorical Transcendence,” Quarterly Journal of
Speech 71 (1985): 188.
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and environmental rhetorics, in which we find metaphors such as
“bridge,” “web,” and “consensus” as legitimating epistemological
and argumentative standards.12 “Solidarity” ranks among the cardinal virtues as “a key virtue needed to address the problems of our
world.” 13 “There is a basic movement in the human world,” writes
Stewart, “and it is toward relation, not division.” 14
Within the past several decades, communication studies have
engaged in this discourse of connection by pushing vertically and
horizontally. Along the vertical axis, Rushing, for example, looks
to myth as a unifying scheme that works over and above the divergent factors existing in culture at a given time.15 In the area of mass
communication, Newcomb searches out the embeddedness of
character types and plots within a “larger dialog.” 16 Frank assesses
the constructive contribution of the “new rhetoric” as “nesting different and incompatible values within a larger realm of rhetoric.” 17
The vertical gaze contemplates a “big tent” in which divergent
ideas find agreement stretched-out above in a transcendent vision.
If the vertical movement for unity or integration is transcendent, the horizontal thrust is dialogical. It seeks not transcendence
12. Mary Belenky, C. Blythe Clinchy, Nancy Goldberger, and Jill Tarule, Women’s Ways
of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1986);
Thomas Farrell, “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory,” in J. L. Lucaites,
C. M. Condit, and S. Caudill (eds.), Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader (New
York: Guilford, 1999), p. 144.
13. David Hollenbach, The Common and Good Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 50.
14. John Stewart, Bridges Not Walls: a Book about Interpersonal Communication (Boston,
McGraw Hill, 2009), p. 9.
15. Cf., Rushing.
16. Horace Newcomb, “On the Dialogical Aspects of Mass Communication,” Critical
Studies in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 42.
17. David Frank, “Argumentation Studies in the Wake of The New Rhetoric,” Argumentation and Advocacy 40 (2004): 270.
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but lateral “connection” as a mode of managing human affairs.18
For example, Bakhtin, whom rhetorical theorists count among
themselves,19 counsels not a transcendence of pluralism but an
acknowledgment of the inherent unity-diversity dynamic in ordinary human action that he describes as both “centripetal” (tending toward unity) and “centrifugal” (tending toward distinction”).
Noting the “situational nature of rhetoric,” Cherwitz and Darwin
present a “relational” approach to meaning, positing an understanding of language “embodying the dynamic inter relationships
among rhetors, auditors, and other entities in the world” and that
“refers with” instead of “referring to.” 20 Hatch explores a dialogic
rhetoric that fosters racial atonement and reconciliation.21
Whether moving “upward” or “sideways,” an array of contemporary rhetorical and communication studies participates in a
common exploration for that which facilitates community, relationship, understanding, and communion. Thus, one can recognize
within communication theories of the past several decades a shift
in focus from the singular communicator privileged within Ehninger’s first three systems of rhetoric to the collaboration of communicators. Stewart makes this same point: “Humans live in worlds
of meaning, and communication is the process of collaboratively
constructing those meanings.” 22 Recognizing the disciplinary
18. G. T. Fairhurst, and L. Putnam, “Organizations as Discursive Constructions,”
Communication Theory 14 (2004): 5–26.
19. John Murphy, “Mikhail Bakhtin and the Rhetorical Tradition,” Quarterly Journal
of Speech 87 (2001): 259–277.
20. Richard Cherwitz and Thomas Darwin, “Beyond Reductionism in Rhetorical
Theories of Meaning,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 27 (1994): 314, italics theirs.
21. John Hatch, “Dialogic Rhetoric in Letters Across the Divide: A Dance of (Good)
Faith toward Racial Reconciliation,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 12 (2009): 485–532.
22. John Stewart, Bridges Not Walls: a Book about Interpersonal Communication (Boston,
McGraw Hill, 2009), p. 18.
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coherence of these studies, however, requires a grammar for viewing various studies in the field as a collective unit. Later, this essay
proposes “the Trinity” as providing such a critical grammar.
In the phenomenological tradition, one finds a relational perspective in Carl Rogers’ development of “empathic listening” or
“therapeutic listening.” Widely incorporated in interpersonal
communication studies, Rogers’ approach asks whether two people can get beyond surface impressions and connect on a deeper
level . . . and describes conditions for personality and relationship
change. Rogers’ much-acclaimed “Empathic Understanding” entails temporarily laying aside one’s own views and values and entering into another’s world without prejudice: an active process of
seeking to hear the other’s thoughts, feelings, tones, and meanings. Along similar lines, the Anxiety/Uncertainty Management
(AUM) Theory of Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment applies this
same perspective in the intercultural realm.23 According to AUM,
successful “sojourners,” in a process of “mindfulness,” step outside
of themselves and their cultural systems to enter a host country
with a goal of attaining effective intercultural communication.24
Cissna and Anderson extract the metaphysical implications of
such dialogic perspectives:
[D]ialogic theory presumes an elemental human truth that
emerges only in the meeting of person with person, with the
moments of I meeting Thou with the serendipity of reply.
Within postmodern assumptions dialogic truth is not a
23. William B Gudykunst, “An Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Theory of
Strangers’ Intercultural Adjustment,” in William B. Gudykunst (ed.), Theorizing about
Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005): pp. 419–458.
24. Ibid., pp. 289 ff.
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matter of propositions but of presence, and it is available to
be examined not propositionally, but conversationally.25
Similarly, the Theory of Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) maintains that “persons in conversation co-construct
their social realities and are simultaneously shaped by the worlds
they create.” 26 CMM is concerned with “what kind of identities,
episodes, relationships, and cultures are being constructed by the
patterns of communication put together as people interact with
each other.” 27 CMM, like Martin Buber, advocates “dialogic communication” as the optimal form of communication. Buber explains
that dialogic communication “involves remaining in the tension
between holding our own perceptions while being profoundly
open to the other,” a unity-in-distinction tension.28 Like Buber,
Pearce and Pearce hold out the possibility of authentic human
relationships through dialogue—an intentional process in which
“the only agenda both parties have is to understand what it’s like
to be the others.” 29 The impetus for the theory was the resolution
of “conflicts between incommensurate social worlds.” 30
The area of Relational Dialectics also generally maintains that
bonding occurs in both interdependence with and independence
25. K. N. Cissna and R. Anderson, “Theorizing about Dialogic Moments: the BuberRogers Postmodern Themes,” Communication Theory 8 (1998): 88.
26. E. Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory, 6th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill,
2006), p. 69.
27. W. Barnett Pearce, “The Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM),” in Gudykunst, p. 43.
28. W. B. Pearce and K. A. Pearce, “Combining Passions and Abilities: Toward Dialog
and Virtuosity,” Southern Communication Journal 65 (2000), p. 172.
29. Ibid., p. 171.
30. Pearce, p. 45.
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from the other. Baxter and Montgomery 31 are principal protagonists of this area of study, and they draw heavily on Mikhail Bakhtin,
who saw “dialectical tension” as the “deep structure” of all human
experience. They believe that relationships are always in flux, and
they see dialectical tension as providing an opportunity for dialog,
an occasion when partners work out ways mutually to embrace the
conflict between unity with and differentiation from each other.
Baxter, for example, often cites Bakhtin’s core belief that two
voices constitute the minimum for life, the minimum for existence.
Baxter and Montgomery have focused on three overarching relational dialectics present in all relationships (Integration-separation;
Stability-change; and Expression-nonexpression). Likewise, Kim32
in her Culture-Based Conversational Constraints Theory, conceptualizes the independent/interdependent self-construals that
manifest in intercultural communications. She charts the cultural
individualistic-collectivistic axes on which persons operate. People
are “both joined and separate,” wrote Burke, “at once a distinct
substance and consubstantial with one another.” 33 In being identified with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than himself or herself. Yet at the same time he or she remains unique, an
individual locus of motives. Thus he or she is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another.34
While Burke states that persuasion results from a sense of oneness that a rhetor could create with another person, Buber has
31. Leslie A. Baxter, and Barbara Montgomery, Relating: Dialogue and Dialectics
(Guilford: New York, 1996).
32. M. Kim, “Culture-Based Conversational Constraints Theory,” in Gudykunst, pp.
93–117.
33. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969), p. 21.
34. Ibid.
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written about the essential role of “distance” in “unions.” 35 He
maintains that “distancing” or “setting at a distance” is “plain from
the fact that one can enter into relation only with being which has
been set at a distance, more precisely, has become an independent
opposite.” 36 Czubaroff maintains that such distance is fundamental to communication, including in communication marked by
conflict:
Where logical unity, synthesis, and agreement are goals in
dialectic, the dialogical meeting of persons is marked by
“over-againstness” and, often, by “tragic conflict” which may
arise because “each is as he is.” However, though a dialogue
may not result in logical agreement or unanimity, it reminds
us that real otherness “can be affirmed in opposing it.” 37
For Buber, however, “the other” is not left “out there.” He views
people as interdependent and affirms their capacity to “commune
and to covenant” with one another.38 In fact, he extols “reciprocity”: “Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal
reciprocity.” 39 Buber sets out prerequisites for this communion,
which Czubaroff delineates.40 Unity, or “becoming one,” arises out
of these conditions. Buber explains that:
35. Martin Buber, “Distance in Relation,” in Knowledge of Man, trans., M. Friedman
and R. G. Smith (New York: Harper Row, 1965), p. 44.
36. Ibid., pp. 59–60.
37. J. Czubaroff, “Dialogical Rhetoric: An Application of Martin Buber’s Philosophy
of Dialog,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 86 (2000): 170.
38. Martin Buber, “Elements of the Interhuman,” in Friedman and Smith, trans., p. 91.
39. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans., W. Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribners,
1970), p. 67.
40. Czubaroff, p. 177.
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When my partner in a common situation becomes thus
alive to me, here and now for the first time does the other
become a self for me. . . . This becoming a self for me is to be
understood not in a psychological but in a strictly ontological sense, and should therefore rather be called “becoming
a self with me” . . . it is ontologically complete only when
the other knows that he is made present by me in his self
and when this knowledge induces the process of his inmost
self-becoming.41
Quigley maintains that this impulse to identify with the other
“arises out of division; humans are born and exist as biologically
separate beings and therefore seek to identify, through communication, in order to overcome separateness.” 42
In short, Burke contemplated identification and consubstantiation more than sixty years ago. Buber philosophized about
communion and reciprocity nearly forty years ago. And Stewart
published his earliest edition of Bridges Not Walls about that same
time. Viewed collectively, a dialogical current began in the midtwentieth century and now cuts across contemporary communication studies in which communication scholars navigate the
relational tension between “the person” and “the other.” Together
these studies envision communicating partners in trusting relationships comprised fundamentally of the two parties’ disposition toward “making themselves one” with each other. The goal
of interdependent self-construal, writes Kim, “is to maintain
41. Buber, “Distance in Relation,” p. 71.
42. Brooke Quigley, “ ‘Identification’ as a Key Term in Kenneth Burke’s Rhetorical
Theory,”American Communication Journal 1 (1998). Retrieved on February 7, 2013, from
http://ac-journal.org/journal/vol1/iss3/burke/quigley.html.
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connectedness and harmony with significant others.” 43 But to
grasp the relational dynamic around which a body of contemporary communication studies coheres calls for a grammar for viewing various studies in the field as a collective unit. “The Trinity,” I
will argue, provides that critical grammar. Moreover, I will show
that Trinitarian thought contributes to the relational, dialogic line,
especially as explored recently in the work of Chiara Lubich.
The Trinity as Trope
To examine these theories with a view toward clarifying their
collective quality and overriding motives, I adopt the “Upward
Way” that Kenneth Burke employs in his study of language entitled Grammar of Motives.44 Burke’s system is a hermeneutic in
which “a vision of the One” enlightens, in a downward move, the
“many divergences” of the elements that fall under the vision and
aids in “the discovery of essential motives” of those elements.45 In
Rhetoric of Religion, Burke states that “in the study of human motives, we should begin with complex theories of transcendence
(as in theology and metaphysics) rather than with the terminologies of simplified laboratory experiment.” 46 The particular “complex theory” that he uses—at once both extrinsic and analogous
to communication studies—is Christian theology. Burke finds an
interpretive, unifying framework, particularly in “the Trinity,” that,
by way of analogy, brings fresh insight into his language study, or
“logology.” Burke defends the use of a religious form to investigate
the secular study of language, insisting that no religious belief is
43. Kim, p. 105.
44. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Berkley: University of
California Press, 1961), p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as RR.)
45. Ibid., p. 430.
46. Ibid., p. 5.
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required in the process. He explains that theology adopts language
of the material world to explain the immaterial and argues that he
is merely reversing the process. He reasons that “statements that
great theologians have made about the nature of ‘God’ might be
adapted mutatis mutandis for use as purely secular observation on
the nature of words.” 47
But Burke is interested primarily in symbols (words) not the
broader concern of relations and communion constituted in or
performed through communication. Burke’s principal project is
to understand language theory by consulting religious studies of
motives because those studies, he observes, overcome reductionist
tendencies found in language studies. He selects the particular religious figure of the Trinity because it expresses a dialectical interdependency of the word and the thing named. He seeks to explore
the nature of language. Nevertheless, the Trinity seems useful to
my present purpose as well in arguing for the communitarian tendency of contemporary communication theory and of proposing a
communitarian ethic of communication.
The Trinity furnishes an integrative, if at first glance abstruse,
model for encapsulating these communitarian impulses within
communication studies that respond to the pressing needs of our
time. While providing an organizing scheme for a variety of theories in the field, it prefigures, on the ontological level, a contemporary view of human interchange. More than this, the Trinity brings
to light “something more” than what is contained in contemporary communication studies; it helps to advance a philosophy of
communication that poses “communion” as its principal function
and to impart ontological status to human connection-making. It
stands as a counterpoint to today’s tendency to obscure personal
47. Ibid., p. 1, italics his.
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relations in its emphasis on the collective or sociological dimension, and, instead, locates communication in the inter-human. As
such, the Trinity serves as an apt architectonic of communication
studies, not merely as a theological construct but as a trope that
prefigures the dialogic current in communication studies. I thus
apply the Trinity beyond the study of language as Burke used it,
to consider an ideal of communication toward which communication practice might aim. Burke deciphers the framework of Trinity
from Augustine’s reflections on his conversion in his Confessions.
Instead, I want to broaden the conceptual contours of the Trinity
to draw out the communitarian dimensions that I find salient in
contemporary communication studies.
To explore the ontological implications of the Trinity for communication, I refer first to The Nicene Creed, the text that expresses its contents most explicitly. It serves as a touchstone of
Christian belief for Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and most Protestant Churches and is organized around the three Persons of the
Trinity. Each of the Persons possesses distinctive characteristics:
•• The “Father” is maker of all things;
•• The “Son” is consubstantial to the Father;
•• The “Holy Spirit” is the Lord and giver of life.48
Although the Persons of the Trinity are here presented as three
distinct Persons, their distinctiveness as Persons obtains relationally not substantially: The Father is Father of the Son; the Son is
Son of the Father; the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of love between
48. The language of “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” is the foundation of the Christian
tradition. Yet “Parent, Child, and Love” might capture the relational dimension that I
want to emphasize.
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Father and Son. And their relational kenotic giving themselves
over totally to each other accords them one nature. The Persons
exist simultaneously as distinct and one, or “triune,” sharing one
being or substance. Downey states succinctly that “the mystery
of God is profoundly relational, and this relational mystery is expressed in the language of Father, Son, Spirit.” 49 Bakhtin recognizes this same facet of Trinitarian unity and distinction in his
theology of discourse, as Mihailovic notes:
As people have intuited, there is much in Bakhtin’s criticism
that does indeed lend itself to theological paradigms: his
conceptions of dialogue and polyphony seemingly resonant
with trinitarian unity within diversity and the notion of embodied social discourse highly suggestive of an incarnational
model.50
A philosophy of being issues from this Trinitarian construct.
The belief in God of the Cappadocian Fathers’ in the fourth century as a “relational unity” extended to an understanding of the
human person, made in the image of God, as likewise a relational
being. Thompson explains how the belief expresses a philosophy
of human being:
[I]t gives concrete particularity to the persons who interrelate and so constitute the deity, and at the same time it conceives God’s being in these distinctions as creative of or in
49. Michael Downey, Altogether Gift: A Trinitarian Spirituality (Maryknoll, New York:
Orbis Books, 2000), p. 12.
50. Alexar Mihailovic, Corporeal Words: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Theology of Discourse (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 1.
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fact existing as communion. As a paradigm for humanity it
sees personhood as basically relational, concrete and communitarian. In this way it has reciprocity and relationship as its
very essence and so counters all trends to define and understand personal existence in purely individualistic terms. . . .
So central was the notion of “mutual relations” to St. Augustine that he objected even to the use of “person” in describing
the Trinity because of its suggestion of individualism.51
To speak of relationality is to remain vague and perhaps naively
idealistic about human communication. However, the Trinitarian
model also offers unique resources in naming a precise sort of relationality generated and sustained by the notions of kenosis and
perichoresis. Central to this triune being is perichoresis: the notion
of the indwelling of each of the three Persons in the other two
Persons. This mutual indwelling is the result of kenosis, or the selfemptying of the Father/Parent and the Son/Child in the loving
donation one to the other.1 The action is mutual, and this circulation of love through the Holy Spirit reflects a relationship of
three Persons (hypostases) in one homousion (being or nature) and
communion among the three Persons. Each communicates to the
others the Person’s whole being as gift of to the other who, in turn,
reciprocates. Each is known fully to the other because each has
fully given and fully received the other. As Wilken notes, “gift and
love, as used in the Scriptures, are relational terms and have built
into them reciprocity and mutuality.” 52

As I said at the end of the previous section, I want to introduce
into this conversation the Trinitarian thought of Chiara Lubich
especially because it provides a unique perspective on this topic
that links ontology with praxis, relational being with communication, and kenosis with perichoresis. I will argue that her mystical
theology and spirituality make significant contributions to the current of dialogical thought in communication studies. In his recent
work, The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity: Towards a Theology of Communion,53 Thomas Norris explains that fundamental to
Lubich’s Trinitarian ontology is an integration of the categories we
have been discussing, namely: relationality and reciprocity, kenosis
and perichoresis, unity and communion. But he also makes it clear
that for Lubich, one cannot speak of these realities without mention of the Cross. And one cannot understand the Cross, or indeed
the Trinity itself, without understanding love.
For Lubich, the event of Jesus’s crucifixion and accompanying
experience of abandonment (Matthew 27:46) is central to her Trinitarian understanding of kenotic love. In the abandonment, Jesus
poses a question, “Why,” to which he does not receive an answer.
What Lubich calls “The Cry” encompasses disrupted communication and communication breakdown, a certain ex-communication
as well as silence.54 Only then does Jesus place his spirit into the
hands of the Father. The vision of Trinity proposed here is thus not
a communicative utopia: a one-to-one correspondence between
what is intended and what is understood between two persons.
Instead, it is the emptying and donation of self without condition

51. John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), p. 127.
52. Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought (Yale University Press:
New Haven, 2003), p. 104, emphasis his.

53. Thomas J. Norris, The Trinity: Life of God, Hope for Humanity: Towards a Theology of
Communion (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2009).
54. Chiara Lubich, The Cry: Of Jesus Crucified and Forsaken (New York: New City
Press, 2001).
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which discloses the essential characteristic of the Trinity: Love as
the kenotic giving of oneself as gift to the Other.
Lubich finds in this aspect of the Cross a glimpse into communication within the Trinity itself. In Essential Writings, a collection
of her writings and speeches, Lubich contemplates the “cry” of the
Person of Jesus, which she describes as his fullest expression of the
Word, the height of his communication. The “great communicator,” whom Lubich names “Jesus Forsaken,” found himself alone in
his “Cry.” Lubich infers a similar communication role in Mary,
made “desolate” by the loss of her Son, the Word, in this Trinitarian disposition. Lubich says:
The word must rest on silence, like a painting on a background. Silencing the creature in them and on this silence
letting the Spirit of the Lord speak, professionals in communication will be more like Mary, the transparency of God.55
The Cry instantiates the kenosis of “non-being” of Jesus in the
moment of his abandonment. He rests his spirit on the silence of
God who is Love, and thereby works his greatest communicative
act of Love for humanity. Thus he is precisely in the moment in
which he is not. Buber has addressed this phenomenon of being
when one is not:
The non-active quality of the dialogical educator’s influence seems to be related to the fact that, as a dialogical and
not instrumental rhetor, he is not motivated by particular
55. Chiara Lubich, Essential Writings: Spirituality, Dialogue, Culture (New York: New
City Press, 2007), pp. 300–301.
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needs or goals and does not have a preset particular message,
“nothing particular, nothing partial is at work in man and
thus nothing of him intrudes into the world. It is the whole
human being, closed in its wholeness, at rest in its wholeness, that is active here, as the human being has become an
active whole.” 56
Lubich explains the kenosis of love as “non-being” in the communication of one’s relational self in the economy of the Trinity in
more metaphysical terms:
The Father generates the Son out of love, he loses himself in
the Son, he lives in him; in a certain sense he makes himself
“non-being” out of love, and for this very reason, he is, he is
the Father. The Son, as echo of the Father, out of love turns
to him, he loses himself in the Father, he lives in him, and
in a certain sense he makes himself “non-being” out of love;
and for this very reason, he is, he is the Son. The Holy Spirit,
since he is the mutual love between the Father and the Son,
their bond of unity, in a certain sense he also makes himself
“non-being” out of love, and for this very reason, he is, he is
the Holy Spirit.57
If we consider the Son in the Father, we must think of the
Son as a nothingness (a nothingness of love) in order to
think of God as One. And if we consider the Father in the
56. Czubaroff, p. 181.
57. Lubich, Chiara, “Toward a Theology and Philosophy of Unity,” in An Introduction
to the Abba School: Conversations from the Focolare’s Interdisciplinary Study Center (Hyde
Park, NY: New City Press. 2002), p. 24.
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Son, we must think of the Father as a nothingness (a nothingness of love) in order to think of God as One. There are
three in the Most Holy Trinity, and yet they are One because Love is not and is at the same time. . . . [E]ach one is
complete by not-being, indwelling fully in the others, in an
eternal self-giving. . . . Herein lies the dynamics of life within
the Trinity, which is revealed to us as unconditional, reciprocal self-giving, as mutual loving, self-emptying out of love, as
total and eternal communion.58
In the second quotation, we can see how kenotic love can be mutual, reciprocal self-giving and receiving in a way that creates communion. Here we see what Norris meant when he said that all the
categories we have been discussing in this article are integrated in
Lubich’s thought.
Similarly, Thompson draws on theologian Hans Urs Von
Balthasar, who had great respect for Lubich, to explain how in the
moment of separation, Jesus reveals his true nature and that of the
Trinity:
There is therefore no ontological separation in God.
Balthasar sees this as analogous to the distinction and even
distance within God between the Father and the Son by the
Holy Spirit—a distance which is overcome by their unity in
love. . . . The drama of this event as a paradox of unity and
otherness is possible only because it is based on the prior
58. Quoted by Piero Coda in “The Experience and Understanding of the Faith in
God-Trinity from Saint Augustine to Chiara Lubich,” New Humanity Review 15
(2010): 38.
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drama of the triune life, where, in the relationship between
Father and Son, there is a distance and distinction and yet
unity by the Holy Spirit.59
The distinction-unity reality of the Son expresses Jesus’ kenosis:
“the self-emptying of Jesus Christ first in the Incarnation and then
on the cross, whereby he makes himself vulnerable, entering into
the condition of human vulnerability as the icon of God’s love.” 60
The kenotic act in the process of communication opens oneself to
the other in an act of love that makes one vulnerable but also places
oneself in the other. If the other responds, there is communion.
Lubich highlights another key feature contained in this model
of the Trinity. She characterizes the Trinitarian relation as consonant with the understanding that God is love. Love by its nature,
says Lubich, suggests at least two persons. It tends toward company. This calls to mind a triune God in which mutual love is the
essence of God as Trinity. Its antithesis is single-person power that
tends toward aloneness; one who seeks power generally seeks it for
himself or herself. A single-Person God tends to represent sovereign power without the crowning element of love. Lubich thus
notes that “the heart of Christian anthropology” is contained in
Jesus’ “New Commandment” to “love one another,” “with which
it is possible to live the Trinitarian life on earth.” 61 Schindler comments on this ontological meaning of the Trinity and its dynamic
of unity as a basis for human relations: “The fullness of each person
coincides with the ‘self-emptying’ entailed in being wholly for the
59. Thompson, p. 52.
60. Downey, p. 27.
61. Lubich, Essential Writings, p. 25.
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other.” 62 Lubich herself writes about the life of the Trinity lived in
the midst of people:
And so I no longer love only silence, but also the word: the
communication between God in me with God in my brother
or sister. And if these two heavens meet, a single Trinity
comes to be, where the two are like Father and Son and
among them is the Holy Spirit.63
Such a view of Trinity is accessible and applicable to human affairs. In Downey’s words, it is “an eminently practical teaching,
expressing not only who and how we understand God to be, but
what we think human persons are called to be and become . . .” 64
Toward a Trinitarian Communication Ethic
We can thus add to the philosophies of being that are attached
to Ehninger’s systems of rhetoric—humans as rational beings; humans as cognitive beings; humans as sociological beings—the philosophy marking today’s scholarship that humans are relational
beings. Whereas Burke has used the Trinity in Rhetoric of Religion
to show how logology appropriates insights about language from
theology, highlighting the interdependency of the word and the
thing named, I am proposing in this essay a correspondence between the dialogical relating among the Persons of the Trinity and
the nature of communication among human persons. By applying
the lens of the Trinity to view communication studies collectively,
62. David L. Schindler, “Introduction,” in An Introduction to the Abba School: Conversations from the Focolare’s Interdisciplinary Study Center, p. 8
63. Lubich, Essential Writings, p. 33.
64. Downey, p. 12.
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I want to affirm within these studies the notion of our interrelatedness as persons in dialogue.
The dialogical communication ethics I submit thus goes beyond Burke’s logology that investigates religious discourse for its
insight into language (understood as a system of symbols) though
John Stewart maintains that even language might better be understood as “articulate contact,” dialogue, or relating. I should like to
direct attention, instead, from language to human communication.
Likewise, the dialogic I have in mind pushes past the “modest”
and “minimalist” dialogical ethic of Arnett, Fritz, and Bell that
privileges tolerance and “common ground” over unity or communion
among disparate standpoints as a moral standard. Arnett and his
collaborators posit a “bookstore” as an emblem of the minimalist
ethic they advocate:
Within the physical walls of the bookstore, one encounters
many others who adhere to competing views of the good,
but who share an interest in reading and learning. While one
person shops for books on Catholic perspectives on marriage, another may seek a secular volume on relational health
for gay couples. Yet another person seeks information about
planning an estate sale.65
The good of communication in such a place would be to “find
some commonality”—the bookstore itself—and to “learn from
difference.” Arnett and his collaborators stress diversity and otherness in advancing their “minimalist” ethics. Subscribers of such a
65. Ronald Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leanne Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialog and Difference (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), p. 19
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view might contend that humans are far more diverse and “other”
(strange) than the co-eternal Persons of the Trinity. Added to their
case might be the fact that we inhabit separate physical bodies
with various imperfections, limitations, diseases, and deformities;
we spring from myriad different gene pools (ethnicities); we grow
up in radically different cultures; we live in alienated social locations; we have competing or incommensurable needs (through
the accidents of nature and history); and so on. They might insist
that we cannot trust our interlocutors indiscriminately and empty
ourselves into everyone equally. At best, they might concede that
the Trinity would seem to give us an ideal or exemplar to which to
aspire in parent-child, or more generally, family or communities of
faith relations. They might conclude that tolerance and a willingness to learn from the “other” might serve as the only practicable
ideals for which to aim in this world of power plays, fractious politics, and wars.66
But Kahane asks, “[I]f justice is interpreted as the recognition
and accommodation of differences . . . then what will hold together
the more encompassing political community?” 67 Christiansen, too,
points to the limitations of such a dialogic of tolerance:
A dialog that is just an exchange of ideas is doomed to
become intellectual combat [whereas a] dialog that emerges
out of a complex web of relationships is likely over time
66. The author acknowledges the assistance of John Hatch in suggesting the “minimalist/optimist” dichotomy, in anticipating objections to a Trinitarian ethic, and for
offering other helpful comments in shaping the essay.
67. David Kahane, “Diversity, Solidarity, and Civic Friendship,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 7 (1999): 267.
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to produce far more light than heat, more respect than
resentment.68
In place of the “minimalist” ethic, I propose an “optimalist” ethic
grounded precisely in relationship, which, as we have seen, has been
highlighted in theological study, especially in recent decades. An
optimalist ethic advocates that interlocutors affirm fellow interlocutors as persons, make each other fully present, and accept each
other as partners.69 An optimalist ethic pushes further still, in the
vein of Bakhtin, who actually speaks of “perichoresis” (interpenetration) as an ideal state of communication, which would stand
in contrast with the “impenetrability” of egoism.7 0 Buber suggests
the distinction between such an optimalist ethic and a minimalist
one and envisions the potential of the former:
But where the dialog is fulfilled in its being, between partners who have turned to one another in truth, who express
themselves without reserve and are free of desire for semblance, there is brought into being a memorable common
fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else. At such
times, at each such time, the word arises in a substantial way
between [persons] who have been seized in the depths and
opened out by the dynamic of an element of togetherness.
68. Drew Christiansen, “Staying Cool When It’s Hot: Reporting on the Christian
Middle East,” in Dennis D. Cali, ed., Faith and the Media (New York: Paulist Press,
2010), p. 67.
69. Buber, “Elements of Interhuman,” pp. 78–81.
70. Jostein Børtnes, “The Polyphony of Trinity in Bakhtin.” Retrieved on September
18, 2010, from http://www.hum.au.dk/romansk/polyfoni/Polyphonie_V/Bortnes5
.pdf, p. 141.
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The interhuman opens out what otherwise remained
unopened.71
I maintain that the Trinity theologically prefigures such an understanding in contemporary communication studies. It supports
a Trinitarian communitarian ethic that offers unity and distinction;
the person as constituted relationally; self-communication/gift; reciprocity; and relationship as operative principles in fulfilling the ultimate
function of communication: communion. The Trinity analogizes to
the human community inasmuch as it demonstrates an ongoing,
mutual “I-thou” relationship enacted through the communication
of selves and the communion that follows. The Trinitarian grammar proposes kenosis and perichoresis as key ingredients, the “something more” of full personhood: to be united in a mutual relation
of love.
Scholars have applied Trinity to human affairs in various ways,
as Thompson has observed.72 Jacques Maritain saw in the Trinity
a supreme representation of the essential relationality of personhood.73 Along similar lines, Larentzakis, in his essay entitled “The
Social Dimension of the Trinitarian Mystery,” sees the Trinity as
a society of persons and, as Thompson summarizes his view, an
“archetype for the social teaching of the church.” 74 He writes that
“the person, distinguished from the individual, will be properly
71. Buber, “Elements of Interhuman,” p. 86.
72. Thompson, pp. 106–108.
73. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1966).
74. Grigorios Larentzakis, “Trinitarischer kirchnversandnis,” in Trinitat: Aktuelle perspektiven der theologie, ed., Wilhelm Bueuning (Freidburg: Herder, 1984), p. 178, as
described by Thompson, p. 108.
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understood only in fellowship with others.” 75 Joseph Oomen studies the practical applications of the Trinity to the praxis of Christian life.76 Hollenbach recognizes the Trinity as offering guidance
in common life and civil society.77 Similarly, Moltmann states
that “The trinity is our social programme. . . . the exemplar of true
human community, first in the church and also in society.” 78 And
finally, Kasper sees in the Trinity a vision of politics that transcends
the left-wing, right-wing partisan divide:
Such a vision is as far removed from a collectivist communism as it is from an individualistic liberalism. For communion does not dominate the individual being and rights of
the person but rather brings these to fulfillment through the
giving away of what is the person’s own and the reception
of what belongs to others. Communion is thus a union of
persons and at the same time maintains the primacy of the
always unique person. This primacy, however, finds its fulfillment not in an individualistic having but in giving and thus
granting participation in what is one’s own.79

75. Ibid.
76. Joseph Oomen, “The Concept of Trinity and Its Implication for Christian Communication in India,” Bangalore Theological Forum 34 (2002): 75–82.
77. David Hollenbach, The Common and Good Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
78. Jürgen Moltmann, “The Reconciling Power of the Trinity in the Life of the Church
and the World,” in The Reconciling Power of the Trinity. Conference of European Churches,
C.E. C Occasional Paper No. 15 (Geneva: C.E.C, 1983), p. 56.
79. Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans., Matthew J. O’Connell (New York:
Crossroad, 1989), p. 307.
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Again, I would like to introduce the Trinitarian thought of
Chiara Lubich into this conversation, this time not so much in
terms of ontology but spirituality—the praxis of faith. Based on
her spiritual experience, Lubich writes: “I felt that I was created
as a gift for the person next to me, and the person next to me was
created by God as a gift for me as the Father in the Trinity is everything for the Son, and the Son is everything for the Father.” 80
This vision of the human person as gift grounded Lubich’s desire
to live out what she has understood: “The life we must try to imitate is the life of the Holy Trinity, by loving each other, with the
grace of God, in the way the persons of the Holy Trinity love one
another. . . . the mysticism of a unity of souls who are a reflection,
here on earth, of the Trinity above. . . .” 81
For Lubich, this is possible since humanity as a whole has been
created in the image of God—of the Trinity. It is not that just
each individual person is created in the image of God, but the humankind is created as a collective image of the Trinity. The goal of
Lubich’s spirituality of unity is to realize this shared nature of our
relational personhood in daily life. However, she also recognizes
the objections I raised earlier, namely the limitations of our finitude. But she affirms that the Trinitarian life can be lived to a degree because the divine life of God is within each person: “Human
beings are finite and cannot penetrate each other, but God can
penetrate each.” 82 In the following, Lubich speaks about this using
the word “heaven” for this inner presence of God:
80. Judith M. Povilus, United in His Name: Jesus in Our Midst in the Experience and
Thought of Chiara Lubich (New York: New City Press, 1992), p. 67.
81. Ibid., p. 66.
82. Ibid., p. 64.
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I will love then, not silence, but the word . . . that is, the
communication between God in me and God in my neighbor. And if the two heavens meet, there rests a single Trinity
where the two are like Father and Son and among them is
the Holy Spirit. We must recollect ourselves also in the presence of our neighbor, not by escaping our neighbors—but
rather by recollecting them into our heaven and recollecting
ourselves into their heaven.83
I believe that Lubich’s spirituality of living the Trinitarian life
poses a model and a grammar of communication that synthesizes,
on one level, major strands of current communication studies,
and, on another level, the communication act itself: both the “way
things are” and the “way things might be” in the communication
process. One can see reflections of the Trinity within the coordinates of the conventional model of the communication process.
But the Trinity proposes “something more.” It is distinguished
from a “minimalist” perspective in that it advances a gymnastic
of a giving and receiving—“addressivity” and “receptivity”—of
love and the creation of communion as the ideal of communication. In a Trinitarian ethic lived by persons following the model
of Lubich, each person is engaged in mutual gifting, simultaneously and actively “giving to” and “taking in” the other. Each exists
in a situation encompassing them both, and something is generated out of this union, a message, Logos. Even in Burke’s system,
“. . . the word for perfect communion between persons is ‘Love.’ ” 84
Thus, the element of love must be added to the communication
83. Ibid., p. 65.
84. R R, p. 30.
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act and to communication studies to engage them more purely in
Trinitarian grammar. Person 1—Message—Person 2—Feedback
and Feedforward—Environment can be viewed as coordinates of
the Trinitarian dynamic when the two (or more) persons engage in
mutual kenosis and, in turn, perichoresis, or mutual indwelling as far
as possible for finite human beings. The Trinity can thus be viewed
as Icon of communication and for communication studies.
Reporter and communication scholar Michele Zanzucchi
provides an example of the Trinitarian perspective at work in a
newsroom:
We have the practice of submitting articles to at least two
other editors so that what we write truly reflects a sharing
of ideas and perspectives. We also work hard to ensure full
communication and input between the editorial staff and
those who work on graphic design and layout, so that there
is a unity between what we say and how it appears in the
magazine. As with any staff, we have different opinions and
ideas—so it’s often a real exercise to “empty” ourselves so as
to fully understand and appreciate what the other is trying to communicate. But in this atmosphere of giving and
receiving, of mutual love, we are usually able to achieve the
unanimous consent before the magazine is published.85
85. Cali, p. 24. Other scholars have applied this Trinitarian model to their own fields,
mainly in Europe where Chiara Lubich is better known: Antonio Maria Baggio (politics), Brendan Leahy (theology) Bernhard Callebaut (sociology), Pasquale Ferrara (international relations), Donald W. Mitchell (interreligious dialogue), Brendan Purcell
(philosophy), and Luigino Bruni (economics).
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I have observed such an ethic in my own communications with
administrators and colleagues. I remember, for example, feeling
some anxiety in anticipation that what I would be disclosing to
a dean might provoke adverse reactions, but then feeling peace
when she seemed more motivated to understand what I was saying
than to judge it. She listened to me express concerns in an “active”
silent way and entered the heart of what I sought to convey, and,
in turn, offered her own “voice” on these matters. I have sought
to maintain such a communication disposition with colleagues as
well and ordinarily with productive results. It is an Every Person’s
ethic, applicable in both grand and vastly broadcast communications and in the more prosaic communications of responding to a
student’s untutored question, answering the phone, or responding
to an e-mail. Such an ethic might be reckoned a “virtue ethic” in
that it does not prescribe what to do in particular situations that
pose particular moral dilemmas. Instead, it offers an orientation,
an outlook, for viewing fellow interlocutors as persons to whom
one would give oneself and from whom one would in turn receive.
Indeed, within the constraints of fast-paced communication of
today—“a hurried email, followed by a text message, a brief phone
call made between a sandwich and an appointment”—a spirit of
fellowship may be often the only “tool” available to communicators to preserve an “awareness that at the other end of the message
is not an object but a person, a person to be loved, and who can
also love in return.” 86

86. Ibid., p. 31.
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Final Reflections
The current dialogical wave in communication studies gives prominence to “the other.” Within that focus, some attend to “difference”
and suggest means by which understanding and tolerance might
be achieved. Others underscore “the person” and suggest means
by which “harmony” might be achieved through communication
between persons. While the communication studies reviewed here
do not convey the fullness of the Trinitarian grammars of kenosis
and periochoresis, they nonetheless strain toward communion. Thus
the Trinity stands both as an emblem of these contemporary studies and a paradigm of that to which they aspire.
My analysis demonstrates that the Trinity serves as a useful
capsule of significant impulses in contemporary communication
studies. It synthesizes those studies but with its grammar of kenosis
and perichoresis also goes beyond them. The Trinitarian perspective
advanced in the dialogical current of contemporary communication thought, then, has practical application to the field of communication. First, it stresses that the person matters most, not the
medium through which the communication occurs nor even the
message itself. “The Trinity” emblematizes that the person, realized relationally, is something more than a theoretical “other” but
is instead the one with whom “I” am intimately bound. Secondly,
the goal of communion necessarily admits of distinction, as with
the three Persons of the Trinity, who, though one, are, at the same
time, distinct as Persons—Unity and Distinction. Central to the
Trinitarian view of communication is a third notion of reciprocity:
the action is not uni-directional or serial but a coming-and-going.
Communion is achieved not through the communicator’s singular act of scoping out the needs and expectations of one’s fellow
interlocutor, but through a mutual giving between self and other.
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The Trinity thus proposes that to communicate, interlocutors must
“make themselves one,” which entails a certain vacating of self,
kenosis, and a simultaneous fulfillment of self-in-relation, or perichoresis: I in the other person, the other person in me. The Trinity,
thus encompassing a major strand of contemporary communication, performs two functions. One, it highlights the essentially relational character of persons; and two, it names that relationality
in specific ways: love in the form of kenosis and perichoresis. This,
then, is the “something more” of mutual love that the Trinitarian
position proposes that accords its unique value as a unifying ethic.
All of this brings to light dimensions of communication studies—including interpersonal, mass, and rhetorical—that stretch
kenotically toward “the other,” toward “reciprocity” and “communion,” and toward a reality that is generated among two people
engaged in authentic communication and who thus overcome
mis-communication. The spiritual and theological reflections of
Downey, Lubich, Thompson, and others and the Trinitarian studies in other disciplines help bring into relief elements embedded
within major contemporary theories in the field of communication studies. It is my contention that Chiara Lubich best captures
the contemporary and emerging paradigm: the essence of personhood, as expressed in the Trinity, is being for one another while
being in unity with one another. For her, the person is not defined
essentially by substance but by the relationship of giving and receiving where each is gift for the other. The dialogical current in
communication studies can collaborate with Lubich’s Trinitarian
thought and praxis in articulating what persons are, a “here-andnow reality,” and what they can become, a “reality-yet-to-come.” 87
87. Schindler, p. 12.
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Together they can explore the Trinity as a paradigm for communication studies.
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